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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JAMES RICHARD MOORE,
Pl.aintiff-Appell.ant,

vs.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

Case No.

12797

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, J arnes Richard Moore, appeals from
the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus was
heard and denied on January 20, 1972, by the Honorable

2
Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the denial of appel· I
lant's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning of May 5, 1971,
James Richard Moore, was found by police inside the
Eagles Lodge in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The
evidence indicates that appellant had drugs in his posses·
sion immediately following his apprehension (R. 68). Al·
though there was some testimony in the habeas corpus
proceeding to the affect that appellant appeared to be
under the influence of drugs, Deputy Peterson testified
that appellant appeared in all respects normal upon his
apprehension (R. 42-45).
A complaint was subsequently issued on May 17,
1971, charging appellant with second degree burglary,
grand larceny and being in the status of an habitual crim·
inal. The information was amended to drop the habitual
criminal charge (R. 34). On Friday, July 2, 1971, appel·
lant appeared before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall in
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah. Appellant pleaded guilty
to the charges of burglary and grand larceny and was sen·
tenced to serve in the Utah State Prison the indetermin·
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ate sentence provided by law, the two sentences to run
concurrently.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE ARR A I G N MENT AND SENTENCING COMPEL THE
CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT'S PLEA
OF GUILTY WAS INTELLIGENTLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
Appellant, James Richard Moore, was charged with
the crime of burglary in the second degree and grand larceny in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-3 and 7638-1and4 (1953), to-wit:
COUNT I
"That on or about the 15th day of May, 1971,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said
James Richard Moore entered the building of
Eagles Lodge, a corporation, with intent to commit
larceny therein;
COUNT II
"That on or about the 15th day of May, 1971,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said James
Richard Moore stole personal property having a
value in excess of $50.00 lawful money of the
United States, from Eagles Lodge, a corporation"
(T. 3, 4).
In the hearing upon an·aignment before the Honor-
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able Gordon R. Hall, the information containing the
charges above quoted was read to appellant. The record
affirmatively shows that Judge Hall meticulously apprised appellant of his right to trial by jury, his right to
remain silent, and his right to confrontation of witnesses
(T. 4) pursuant to the standards established in Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 273
(1969). The record also reveals appellant understood that
a plea of guilty takes the place of a trial where the elements of the crime would have to be proved (T. 4); that
he had conferred with counsel on repeated occasions before entering his plea (T. 5); and that he desired of his
own free will to enter a plea of guilty and in fact did
enter such plea (T. 6, 7).
Recently, the Tenth Circuit handed down a decision
which greatly strengthens the effect Judge Hall's apprisal
should have upon the issue of voluntariness. Stinson v.
Turner, No. 71-1556 (10th Cir. February 27, 1973) in·
volved a habeas corpus proceeding wherein petitioner·
appellant, imprisoned on the basis of his plea of guilty
to a grand larceny charge, argued this his plea was in·
valid because the record failed to show affirmatively that
he intelligently and voluntarily waived his privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court held the plea valid
pursuant to Boykin, notwithstanding a finding that the
record showed no reference to the privilege against self·
incrimination. It stated:
"In Brady v. U. S., 397 U. S. 742, the
stated that '[t]he new element added in Boykin
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was the requirement that the record must affirmatively show that a defendant who pleaded guilty
entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily'
... we feel that Boykin imposed only that requirement of an affirmative record showing of a voluntary and intelligent plea . . . The main purpose is
. . . to make sure [the accused] has full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequences.'" Id. at 6.
The Court's ruling that the appellant fully understood
the consequences of his plea despite the trial court's failure to mention the privilege against self-incrimination
was based upon an enumeration of rights and privileges
appearing in the record substantially identical to those
listed by Judge Hall referred to previously. The added
element in the instant case, that the record affirmatively
showed reference to and subsequent waiver of the right
to remain silent (T. 4), renders appellant Moore's guilty
plea ipso facto valid.
The foregoing amply demonstrates that appellant's
guilty plea was intelligently and knowingly entered upon
the advise of counsel. In United States, ex rel. Sadler v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 434 F. 2d 997 (3d Cir.
1970) , a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner-appellant claimed that his plea of guilty was invalid because
he was denied adequate assistance of counsel. The court
ruled that appellant's plea of guilty entered with the advice of counsel is presumptively valid and the burden·is
on the habeas corpus applicant to show that the plea was
not knowingly and voluntarily made. The court found

6
that the petitioner had not met that burden. The record
in the instant case compels a similar finding by the court.
The Sadler court further approved the holding in
Moore v. United States, 432 F. 2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970)
which held that the burden of proving inadequate assistance of counsel is also placed upon the habeas corpus
applicant. In the instant case, the record clearly indicates
that appellant was represented by legal counsel who met
with appellant on several occasions before the plea was
entered, who was adequately familiar with the circumstances of appellant's arrest, and who deemed it tactically
advisable to plead to the burglary and larceny counts so
that the habitual criminal charge would be dropped (R.
4-5, 14-15, 22). Nothing in the record would indicate that
the facts are otherwise. Any claim that appellant was
denied effective assistance of counsel is entirely without
merit.

It is manifest that the trial court had ample evidence
upon which to base its finding that appellant's guilty plea
was intelligently and voluntarily entered. In Seibold v.
Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P. 2d 289 (1967), also a
habeas corpus proceeding, the court held that the appellant had entered a guilty plea voluntarily after consult.a·
tion and advice from counsel. The court added the follow·
mg:

"Those findings were amply supported by the
evidence and it is our duty to sustain the trial
court when his rulings are based upon competent
evidence." Id. at 169. See also Farrell v. Turner,
25 Utah 2d 351, 355, 482 P. 2d 117 (1971).
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This Court should likewise sustain the finding of the
lower court that appellant's plea was intelligently and
voluntarily entered.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, respondent respectfully
submits that the judgment and order of the court below
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

